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  The timelessly optimal monetary policy proposed by Woodford (2003) 
may be dominated by alternative timeless policies. We provide a formal 
justification for these alternative policies. We demonstrate why discount rates 
do not matter and establish that optimizing over the unconditional expectation 
of the policy criterion function recovers these alternative strategies. 
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 1. Introduction
Kydland and Prescott (1977) brought into sharp focus the issue of time inconsistency of
optimal policy design in macroeconomic models with forward-looking behavior and rational
expectations. Taylor (1979) proposed searching for policies, under rational expectations,
which maximize the unconditional expectation of the government’s objective function. This
idea has been exploited many times e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), Woodford
(1999), Clarida, Gali and Getler (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Kollman
(2002). However, in most of those papers a numerical approach is adopted to uncover the
optimal rule (sometimes restricted to some or other arbitrary parametric class).
Woodford (2003) proposed a dynamic optimization-based method for solving for the
optimal policy, which he has labelled a "timeless perspective for optimal policy". However,
Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) independently provided a counterexample
which implies that alternative feasible timeless policies exist which dominate that proposed
by Woodford. In this note, building on the Blake-Jensen-McCallum insight, we provide the
ﬁrst full formal justiﬁcation of these alternative strategies. We demonstrate why discount
rates don’t matter in the formulation of our optimal timeless policy, something that a number
of economists have asserted, e.g., Taylor, (1979). Using that insight, we pose and solve a
policy optimization problem that delivers the Blake-Jensen-McCallum timeless policies.
2. The timeless perspective on optimal policy
2.1. A deﬁnition
The timelessly optimal policy is the policy that the government would have decided upon for
the current period had such a decision been taking inﬁnitely far in the past. This perspective
is attractive for a number of reasons. In particular, in the context of monetary policy rules,
as Giannoni and Woodford (2002) note:
"The selection of a policy rule from this perspective means that it is not
necessary to view the choice of the rule as a once and for all commitment, by
which the central bank will be bound no matter how unappealing the rule may
come to appear at a later time. Instead, the bank need only be committed to
determine policy at the later dates by a rule that is optimal from a similar timeless
2perspective. Insofar as the bank model of the economy is expected to guide its
decision in the future as well, there is no reason to expect future behavior that
does not conform to the rule currently adopted - and so there is no inconsistency
involved in adopting the rule now because of its desirable properties if the bank
is expected to follow it indeﬁnitely."
2.2. Formalization
We formalize the Giannoni-Woodford timeless perspective. Consider a discounted quadratic



















Et is the expectations operator conditional on information up through date t, β is the time
discount factor, xt is a vector of target variables, x∗ is a vector of target values which could









Here it is a vector of policy instruments, the value of which is chosen in period t, zt is a
vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables, the value of which may depend upon
both policy actions and exogenous disturbances at date t, Zt is a vector of predetermined
endogenous variables (lags of variables that are included in zt and it).
We further assume that the evolution of the endogenous variables zt and Zt is determined






















and st is a vector of exogenous disturbances.
The policy maker minimizes the loss function (2.1) subject to constraint (2.2). He searches









sst = φ. (2.3)
The timeless perspective policy which we seek to justify is to minimize the unconditional
expectation of the loss function; this is equal to the expectation over all possible initial states
of the economy (Taylor, 1979).
3More formally, the optimal policy from a timeless perspective that we are looking for









s,φ,) which minimizes the unconditional
expectation (e E) of the loss function (2.1), subject to constraint (2.2).
φ
0∗ =a r gm i ne ELt(φ
0), (2.4)
2.3. Woodford’s methodology
Giannoni and Woodford (2002) proposed the following algorithm for ﬁnding the optimal
policy from their timeless perspective:
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, and µt+j is a vector of Lagrange multipliers
associated with the constraints (2.2) (see Giannoni and Woodford (2002), p. 28).
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• Step 3: Ensure commitment to the policy program by ignoring the ﬁrst-order conditions
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The following example demonstrates Giannoni and Woodford’s (2002) method.













and a forward-looking Phillips curve given by
πt = βEtπt+1 + λyt + εt, (2.8)
4where πt is inﬂation at time t, yt is the output gap, and εt is an i.i.d. shock process with













+ µt+j [πt+j − βEtπt+1+j + λyt+j + εt+j]
ª
. (2.9)
The commitment solution, or timelessly optimal solution, proposed by Giannoni and Wood-
ford (2002) is simply to ignore the ﬁrst-order conditions for j =0 . So, in any time period,
















(yt − yt−1). (2.11)
(2.11) relates the path of inﬂation and output to one another in a manner that is commonly
characterized as the timelessly optimal program, and which is used to back out the optimal
value of the interest rate (i.e., policy instrument).
3. What is wrong with this?
Blake (2001) proposed that the optimal timeless policy should in fact maximize the undis-





(yt − βyt−1) (3.1)
then unconditional welfare is higher. To prove his statement he assumes that output and
inﬂation follow the simple dynamic paths
πt = f11yt−1 + f12ut; (3.2)
yt = f21yt−1 + f22ut. (3.3)






(1 − βρ)f12 − 1
βf11 + λ
.
5The unconditional expectation of the value of the loss function can be shown to be














where σ is the standard deviation of ut. Using a numerical algorithm Blake (2001) shows that
policy (3.1) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order and second-order conditions for an optimum. Jensen and
McCallum (2002) also make this point and oﬀer a simulation-based justiﬁcation for replacing
(2.11) with (3.1).
Blake and Kirsanova (2004), using the methodology described in Soderlind (1999), have
also shown that there is a time consistent linear policy which results in smaller losses. How-
ever, those numerical simulations only demonstrate that such policies are conditionally better
than the policy proposed by Woodford’s timeless perspective methodology. Both simulations
made assumptions concerning the output gap in the preceding period. However, as Soderlind
(1999) shows, the optimal (simple) policy parameters depend on initial values, and therefore
it is to be expected that under some values of initial conditions some policies perform better
than others. For instance, in the example just considered, Woodford’s timeless perspective
methodology always dominates when yt−1 =0 , for, in this case, the timeless perspective
policy is the same as the optimal (time inconsistent) policy.
The correct numerical comparison of unconditional timeless policies would involve Monte-
Carlo simulations which would compare the values of loss functions integrating over all pos-
sible initial states; in the current example, of the lagged output gap. None of the numerical
work carried out to date has done this. This was pointed out by Woodford 2003, p.508.
However, Blake’s (2001) counterexample remains without clariﬁcation.
3.1. On the optimal timeless policy and the households’ time discount factor
In this subsection we shall prove that the optimal unconditionally timeless rule does not
depend on the consumers’ discount factor. In the next section, we shall use this insight to
justify the results of Blake-Jensen-McCallum. The formal statement is provided in Proposi-
tion 3.1 which we ascribe to John Taylor as he is the ﬁrst explicit reference to the issue of
unconditionality emphasized above of which we are aware.
Proposition 3.1. (Taylor, 1979) The consumer’s time preference parameter is not impor-
tant for the timeless policymaker. That is, the best timeless policy minimizes losses (3.4)
6for all discount factors γ ∈ (0,1)





Here, lt denotes the period loss function. It follows immediately that,
argmin
φ0




e Elt =a r gm i n
φ0
e Elt.
Hence, we have proved that the same policy is unconditionally optimal for Lt (γ) for any
γ ∈ (0,1)
The Lagrangian constructed in Woodford’s timeless perspective methodology depends on
the consumers’ discount factor, but the optimal policy which minimizes unconditional losses
does not.
Proposition 3.1 is additionally interesting as it demonstrates that the same policy is un-
conditionally optimal for all households, regardless of their individual time discount factors.
4. The Solution
The problem with the timeless perspective methodology proposed by Giannoni and Woodford
(2002) is that it proposes ﬁrst to ﬁnd the optimality conditions for a time inconsistent
or (time) conditional policy and then make the rule "time less" by ignoring ﬁrst period
constraints. In other words, it is as if one were trying to ﬁnd an optimum of the composite
function argminf(g(x)) by writing the ﬁrst order condition for g(x) only. The correct
approach would appear to be to apply the unconditional expectation operator in formulating
the policy Lagrangian and then deriving the optimality conditions. As we shall see, this is
exactly the justiﬁcation required for the Blake-Jensen-McCallum result to go through.
Hence, we propose the following methodology:
• Step 1: Write the (time) conditional Lagrangian (2.9).
• Step 2: Re-formulate this as an unconditional Lagrangian:
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The general conclusion can be formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The ﬁrst order conditions (4.2) are the necessary conditions for problem
(2.4, 2.2)
The proof follows immediately by applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
We contrast these with the Giannoni and Woodford (2002) dynamics, (2.6) above.
4.1. Example













subject to the constraint
πt = βEtπt+1 + λyt + ut.












+ µt+j (πt+j − βEtπt+j+1 − λyt+j − ut+j)
¢
.
Since we search for the timeless optimal policy, we need to minimize the "timeless" La-
grangian, which means we must formulate the problem using the unconditional expectation
of the Lagrangian Lt :

















8The unconditional expectation operator has the following property ∀t,j, e Ext = e Ext+j which
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(2αyt − λµt)=0 .
These relations can be written as πt = −α
λyt+β α
λyt−1. This is the optimal program proposed
by Blake-Jensen-McCallum.
5. Conclusion
We provided a rationale for the numerical-based conclusions of Jensen and McCallum (2002),
and a formal justiﬁcation for the arguments in Blake (2001). We showed how one can justify
and formulate timelessly-optimal policy programs using unconditional expectations.
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